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Abstract— We consider the problem of securing a multicast
network against a wiretapper that can intercept the packets on
a limited number of arbitrary network links of his choice. We
assume that the network implements network coding techniques
to simultaneously deliver all the packets available at the source
to all the destinations. We show how this problem can be looked
at as a network generalization of the Ozarow-Wyner Wiretap
Channel of type II. In particular, we show that network security
can be achieved by using the Ozarow-Wyner approach of coset
coding at the source on top of the implemented network code.
This way, we quickly and transparently recover some of the
results available in the literature on secure network coding for
wiretapped networks. We also derive new bounds on the required
secure code alphabet size and an algorithm for code construction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a communication network represented as a di-
rected graph G = (V,E) with unit capacity edges, an
information source S that multicasts information to t receivers
R1, . . . , Rt located at distinct nodes. Assume that the min-cut
value between the source and each receiver node is n. We
know that a multicast rate of n is possible with linear network
coding [1], [2]. We are here concerned with multicast networks
in which there is an adversary that can access data on a certain
number of links of his choice, and the goal is to maximize the
multicast rate with the constraint of revealing no information
about the multicast data to the adversary.
The problem of making a linear network code information
theoretically secure in the presence of a wiretap adversary
that can look at a bounded number, say µ, of network edges
was first studied by Cai and Yeung in [3]. They considered
directed graphs and demonstrated the existence of a code over
an alphabet with at least
(
|E|
µ
)
elements which can support a
secure multicast rate of up to n−µ. They also showed that such
codes can be designed in O(
(
|E|
µ
)
) steps. The required edge
bandwidth and the secure code design complexity are main
drawbacks of this pioneering work. Feldman et al. derived
trade-offs between security, code alphabet size, and multicaat
rate of secure linear network coding schemes in [4], by using
ideas from secret sharing and abstracting network topology.
Another approach was taken by Jain in [5] who obtained
security by merely exploiting the topology of the network in
question. Weakly secure network coding (which insures that
only useless information rather than none is revealed to the
adversary) was studied by Bhattad and Narayanan in [6], and
practical schemes are missing in this case as well.
A related line of work considers a more powerful adversary,
one that can also modify the packets he observes. Modifying
a certain number of packets in networks which only route
information simply results in their incorrect reception, whereas
modifying the same number of packets carrying linear combi-
nations of source packets can have a more harmful effect since
it can result in incorrect decoding of all source packets. Such
attacks are in network coding literature known as Byzantine
modifications, and the Byzantine modification detection in
networks implementing random network coding was studied
by Ho et al. in [7] and Jaggi et al. in [8]. The approach they
take is to introduce error correction coding at the source so
that the packets carry not only data but also some redundant
information derived from data which will help reduce the
probability of incorrect decoding.
We also find coding at the source a natural approach to
address the information theoretic security of wiretap networks.
In a network where the min-cut value between the source and
each receiver node is n and an adversary can access up to
µ edges of his choice, we introduce at the source a coding
scheme which ensures information theoretic security on the
Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel type II, introduced in [9] and
[10], where the source transmits n symbols to the receiver and
an adversary can access any µ of those symbols.
Ozarow and Wyner showed that the maximum number of
symbols (say k) that the source can communicate to the
receiver securely in the information theoretic sense is equal to
n−µ. They also showed how to encode the k source symbols
into the n channel symbols for secure transmission. Clearly,
if the n channel symbols are multicast over a network not
performing coding (linear combining of the n symbols), the k
source symbols remain secure in the presence of an adversary
with access to any µ edges. We will illustrate later that this is
is not necessarily the case when network coding is performed.
However, we will show that a network code that preserves
security of the k source symbols (coded into the n multicast
symbols in the Ozarow-Wyner manner) can be designed over
a sufficiently large field.
With the observations made by Feldman et al. in [4], it is
easy to show that our scheme is actually equivalent to the
one proposed in the pioneering work of Cai and Yeung in [3].
However, with our approach, we can quickly and transparently
recover some of the results available in the literature on secure
network coding for wiretapped networks. Since the publication
of [3] in which the network code construction is based on the
work of Li et al. in [2], a number of simpler network code
construction algorithms have been proposed (see for example
[11]), [12]. Computational complexity of network coding in
terms of the number of coding nodes and ways to minimize
it have also been studied since then [12], [13], [14]. We will
use these results to derive new bounds on the required secure
code alphabet size and an algorithm for code construction.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, we briefly
review the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel type II problem.
In Sec. III, we introduce the network generalization of this
problem. In Sec. IV, we present an algorithm for secure
network code design and discuss the required code alphabet
size. In Sec. V, we highlight some connections of this work
with the previous work on secure network coding and more
recent work on network error correction.
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL II
We first consider a point-to-point scenario in which the
source can transmit n symbols to the receiver and an adversary
can access any µ of those symbols [9], [10]. For this case, we
know that the maximum number of symbols that the source
can communicate to the receiver securely in the information
theoretic sense is equal to n− µ.
The problem is mathematically formulated as follows. Let
S = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) be the random variable associated with
the k information symbols that the source wishes to send
securely, Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) the random variable associated
with the symbols that are transmitted through the noiseless
channel between the source and the receiver, and Z =
(z1, z2, . . . , zµ) the random variable associated with the wire-
tapped bits of Y . When k ≤ n− µ, there exists an encoding
scheme that maps S into Y so that the uncertainty about S
is not reduced by the knowledge of Z and S is completely
determined (decodable) by the complete knowledge of Y , that
is,
H(S|Z) = H(S) and H(S|Y ) = 0. (1)
For n = 2, k = 1, µ = 1, such a coding scheme can be
organized as follows. If the source bit equals 0, then either 00
or 11 is transmitted through the channel with equal probability.
Similarly, if the source bit equals 1, then either 01 or 10 is
transmitted through the channel with equal probability.
source bit s1: 0 1
codeword y1y2 chosen at random from: {00, 11} {01, 10}
It is easy to see that knowledge of either y1 or y2 does
not reduce the uncertainty about s1, whereas the knowledge
of both y1 and y2 is sufficient to completely determine s1,
namely, s1 = y1 + y2.
In general, k = n− µ symbols can be transmitted securely
by a coding scheme based on an [n, n− k] linear MDS code
C ⊂ Fnq . In this scheme, the encoder is a probabilistic device
which operates on the space Fnq , where q is a large enough
prime power, partitioned into qk cosets of C. The k information
symbols are taken as the syndrome which specifies a coset, and
the transmitted word is chosen uniformly at random from the
specified coset. The decoder recovers the information symbols
by simply computing the syndrome of the received word.
Because of the properties of MDS codes, knowledge any
µ = n − k or fewer symbols will leave uncertainty of the k
information symbols unchanged. The code used in the above
example is the [2, 1] repetition with the parity check matrix
H =
[
1 1
]
. (2)
III. WIRETAP NETWORK II
We now consider again an acyclic multicast network G =
(V,E) with unit capacity edges, an information source, t
receivers, and the value of the mincut to each receiver equal
to n. The goal is to maximize the multicast rate with the
constraint of revealing no information about the multicast data
to the adversary that can access data on any µ links. We
assume that the adversary knows the implemented network
code, i.e. all the coefficients of the linear combinations that
determine the packets on each edge. Moreover, the adversary
is aware of any shared randomness between the source and
the destinations. The last assumption rules out the use of
traditional ”key” cryptography to achieve security.
We know that a multicast rate of n is possible with linear
network coding [1], [2]. It is interesting to ask whether,
using the same network code, the source can multicast k ≤
n − µ symbols securely if it first applies a secure wiretap
channel code (as described above) mapping k into n symbols.
Naturally, this would be a solution if a multicast rate of n can
be achieved just by routing.
Consider this approach for the butterfly network shown in
Fig. 1 where we have n = 2, k = 1, µ = 1. If the source
applies the coding scheme described in the previous section
and the usual network code as in Fig. 1-a, the adversary will
be able to immediately learn the source bit if he taps into
any of the edges BE, EF, ED. Therefore, a network code can
brake down a secure wiretap channel code. However, if the
network code is changed so that node B combines its inputs
over e.g., F3 and the BE coding vector is
[
1 α
]
where α is
a primitive element of F3 (as in Fig. 1-b), the wiretap channel
code remains secure, that is, the adversary cannot gain any
information by accessing any single link in the network. Note
that the wiretap channel code based on the MDS code with
H =
[
1 1
]
remains secure with any network code whose BE
coding vector is linearly independent of
[
1 1
]
.
We will next show that the source can multicast k ≤ n−µ
symbols securely if it first applies a secure wiretap channel
code based on an MDS code with a k×n parity check matrix
H if the network code is such that no linear combination of
µ = n − k or fewer coding vectors belongs to the space
spanned by the rows of H . Let W ⊂ E denote the set
of |W | = µ edges the wiretapper chooses to observe, and
ZW = (z1, z2, . . . , zµ) the random variable associated with
the packets carried by the edges in W . Let CW denote
the matrix whose rows are the coding vectors associated
with the observed edges in W . As in the case of wiretap
channel, S = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) denotes the random variable
associated with the k information symbols that the source
wishes to send securely, and Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) the random
variable associated the n wiretap channel code symbols. The
n symbols of Y will be multicast through the network by
using linear network coding. Consider H(S, Y, ZW ) with the
security requirement H(S|ZW ) = H(S) for all W ⊂ E:
H(S|ZW )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(S)
+H(Y |SZW ) = H(Y |ZW ) +H(S|Y ZW )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
⇒ H(Y |SZW ) = H(Y |ZW )−H(S)
⇒ 0 ≤ n− rank(CW )− k
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Fig. 1. Single-edge wiretap butterfly network with a) insecure network code
and b) secure network code.
Since there is a choice of edges such that rank(CW ) = µ, the
maximum rate for secure transmission is bounded as
k ≤ n− µ.
If the bound is achieved with equality, we have H(Y |SZW ) =
0 and consequently, the system of equations[
S
Zw
]
=
[
H
CW
]
· Y
has to have unique solution for all W for which rank(CW ) =
µ. That is,
rank
[
H
CW
]
= n for all CW s.t. rank(CW ) = µ. (3)
This analysis essentially proves the following result:
Theorem 1: Let G = (V,E) be an acyclic multicast net-
work with unit capacity edges, an information source and the
mincut value to each receiver equal to n. A wiretap code
at the source based on an MDS code with a k × n parity
check matrix H and a network code such that no linear
combination of µ = n − k or fewer coding vectors belongs
to the space spanned by the rows of H make the network
information theoretically secure against a wiretap adversary
who can observe at most µ ≤ n − k edges. Any adversary
able to observe more than n − k edges will have uncertainty
about the source smaller than k.
The above analysis shows that the maximum throughput
can be achieved by applying a wiretap channel code at the
source and then designing the network code while respecting
certain constraints. The decoding of secure source symbols S
is then merely matrix multiplication of the decoded multicast
symbols Y . The method gives us a better insight of how much
information the adversary gets if he can access more edges
than the code is designed for. It also gives us an insight on
how to simply design secure network codes in some cases over
much smaller alphabets then currently deemed necessary. Both
claims are illustrated in the example below.
IV. NETWORK CODE DESIGN ALPHABET SIZE
The approach described previously in the literature for
finding a secure multicast network code consisted of decou-
pling the problem of designing a multicast network code and
making it secure by using some code on top of it. Feldman
et al. showed in [4] that there exist networks where the
above construction might require a quite large field size. We
investigate here a different construction that, as was hinted in
the conclusion of [4], exploits the topology of the network.
This is accomplished by incorporating the security constraints
in the Linear Information Flow (LIF) algorithm of [11] that
constructs linear multicast network codes in polynomial time
in the number of edges in the graph. The result is a better lower
bound on the sufficient field size. However, the modified LIF
algorithm does not have polynomial time complexity.
We start by giving a brief high level overview of the LIF
algorithm of [11]. The inputs of the algorithm are the network,
the source node, the t destination nodes and the number n
of packets that need to be multicast to all the destinations.
Assuming the min-cut between the source and any destination
is at least n, the algorithm outputs a linear network code that
guaranties the delivery of the n packets to all the destinations.
The algorithm starts by 1) finding t flows F1, F2, . . . , Ft of
value n each, from the source to to each destination and 2)
setting t n × n matrices BFj (one for each receiver) equal
to In×n Then, it goes over the network edges, visiting each
one in topological order. In each iteration, the algorithm finds a
suitable local encoding vector for the visited edge, and updates
the t matrices BFj , each formed by the global encoding vectors
of the n last visited edges in the flow Fj . The algorithm
maintains the invariant that the matrices BFj remain invertible
after each iteration. Thus, when it terminates, each destination
will get n linear combination of the original packets that form
a full rank system. Thus each destination can solve for these
packets by inverting the corresponding system.
An important result of the previous algorithm, is that a
field of size at least t (the number of destinations) is always
sufficient for finding the desired network code. As shown in
[11, Lemma 8], this follows from the fact that a field of size
larger or equal to t is actually sufficient for satisfying the
condition that the t matrices BFj are always invertible.
We modify the LIF algorithm so it outputs a secure network
code in the following way. We fix the k × n parity check
matrix H . WLOG, we assume that the µ packets observed
by the wiretapper are linearly independent, i.e. rank CW =
µ. We denote by ei the edge visited at the i-th iteration of
the LIF algorithm, and by Pi the set of the edges that have
been processed by the end of it. Then, we extend the set of
invariants to make sure that the encoding vectors are chosen
so the matrices MW =
[
H
Cw
]
are also invertible; which by
Theorem 1 achieves the security condition. More precisely,
using the same techniques as the original LIF algorithm, we
make sure that by the end of the ith iteration, the matrices BFj
and the matrices MWi are invertible; where Wi = {ei} ∪W ′
and W ′ is a subset of Pi of order µ−1 = n−k−1. The total
number of the matrices that need to be kept invertible in this
modified version of the LIF algorithm is at most
(
|E|−1
µ−1
)
+ t
(which corresponds to the last iteration). Thus, similarly as in
[11, Lemma 8], we obtain the following improved bound on
the alphabet size for secure multicast:
Theorem 2: Let G = (V,E) be an acyclic network with
unit capacity edges, an information source, and the mincut
value to each of the t receivers equal to n. A secure mulitcast
at rate k ≤ n in the presence of a wiretapper who can observe
at most µ ≤ n− k edges is always possible over the alphabet
Fq of size
q >
(
|E| − 1
µ− 1
)
+ t. (4)
Bound (4) can be further improved by realizing as was
first done in [12] that not all edges in the network carry
different linear combination of source symbols. Langberg et al.
showed in [13, Thm. 5] that the problem of finding multicast
network codes for a network G can be reduced to solving
the same problem for a special equivalent network Ĝ with
same parameters n and t, which has the properties that all
nodes except the source and the destinations have total degree
3 and at most n3t2 of its nodes have in-degree 2. These nodes
are called encoding nodes, whereas the other ones are called
forwarding nodes since the packets carried by their outgoing
edges are just copies of the ones available at their single
incoming edge. Given a network code for Ĝ, a one for G
can be found efficiently over the same field. And, the set of
global encoding vectors of the edges of G would be a subset
of the one of Ĝ.
Going back the security problem over a network G, one can
try to find a secure network code for the equivalent network
Ĝ, and then use the procedure described in [13] and [14] to
construct a network code for G which will also be secure.
Now consider the problem of finding secure network codes
for Ĝ. This problem will not change if the wiretapper is not
allowed to wiretap the forwarding edges. Therefore, the set of
edges that the wiretapper might have access to consists of the
encoding edges and the edges outgoing from the source, and is
of order n3t2+δ, where δ is the out-degree of the source. Now,
applying Theorem 2 on Ĝ and taking into consideration the
restriction on the edges that can be potentially wiretapped, we
obtain the following bound on the sufficient field size which
is independent of the size of the network.
Corollary 1: For the transmission scenario of Thm. 2, a
secure mulitcast network code always exists over the alphabet
Fq of size
q >
(
k3t2 + δ
µ− 1
)
+ t. (5)
For networks with two sources, we can completely settle
the question on the required alphabet size for a secure network
code. Note that the adversary has to be limited to observing at
most one edge of his choice. Based on the work of Fragouli
and Soljanin in [12], the coding problem for these networks
is equivalent to a vertex coloring problem of some specially
designed graphs, where the colors are actually the points on
the projective line PG(1, q):
[0 1], [1 0], and [1αi] for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 2, (6)
where α is a primitive element of Fq . Clearly, any network
with two sources and arbitrary number of receives can be
securely coded by reducing the set of available colors in (6) by
removing point (color) [1 1] and applying a wiretap code based
on the matrix H = [1 1] as in the example above. Alphabet
size sufficient to securely code all network with two sources
also follows from [12]:
Theorem 3: For any configuration with two sources t re-
ceivers, the code alphabet Fq of size
⌊
√
2t− 7/4 + 1/2⌋+ 1
is sufficient for a secure network code. There exist configura-
tions for which it is necessary.
The wiretap approach to network security also provides the
exact alphabet size and secure code for a class of networks
known as combination networks and are illustrated in Fig. 2.
There are
(
M
n
)
receiver nodes. Note that each n nodes of the
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · · · · ·
n
M
n
R1
R(Mh )
Fig. 2. Combination B(n,M) network.
second layer are observed by a receiver. It is easy to see that
an [M + k, n] Reed Solomon code can be used, namely, the
first k rows its parity check matrix can be used for the cosset
code and the rest as the coding vectors of the M edges going
out of the source.
V. CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER SCHEMES
A number of connections between secure network coding
with the concurrent work on network error correction can be
observed [15], [16], [17]. We here describe the relationship
between the proposed scheme and previously known construc-
tions. Cai and Yeung were first to study the design of secure
network codes for multicast demands [3]. They showed that,
in the setting described above, a secure network code can be
found for any k ≤ n− µ. Their construction is equivalent to
the following scheme:
1) Generate a vector R = (r1, r2, . . . , rµ)T choosing its
components uniformly at random over Fq ,
2) Form vector X by concatenating the µ random symbols
R to the k source symbols S:
X =
[
S
R
]
= (s1, . . . , sk, r1, . . . , rµ)
T
3) Chose an invertible n × n matrix over Fq and a
linear code multicast (LCM) [2] to ensure the security
condition (1). (It is shown in [3, Thm. 1] that such LCM
and T can be found provided that q >
(
|E|
µ
)
.)
4) Compute Y = TX and multicast Y to all the destina-
tions by using the constructed code.
Feldman et al. considered also the same problem in [4].
Adopting the same approach of [3], they showed that in order
for the code to be secure, the matrix T should satisfy certain
conditions ([4, Thm. 6]), that we restate here for convenience:
In the above transmission scheme, the security condition (1)
holds if and only if any set of vectors consisting of
1) at most µ linearly independent global edge coding
vectors and/or
2) any number of vectors from the first k rows of T−1
is linearly independent. They also showed that if one sacrifices
in the number of information packets, that is, take k < n−µ,
then one can find secure network codes over fields of size
much smaller than the very large bound q >
(
|E|
µ
)
.
We will now show that our approach based on coding for
the wiretap channel at the source is equivalent to the above
stated scheme [3] with the conditions of [4].
Claim 1: Let T and C be a matrix and a corresponding
secure network code satisfying the above conditions. Set H =
T ∗ where T ∗ is the k×n matrix formed by taking the first k
rows of T−1. Then H and C satisfy the condition of Thm. 1.
Proof: Consider the secure multicast scheme of [3] as
presented above. For a given information vector S ∈ Fkq , let
B(S) be the set of all possible vectors Y ∈ Fnq that could
be multicast through the network under this scheme. More
precisely,
B(S) =
{
Y ∈ Fnq |Y = TX,X =
[
S
R
]
, R ∈ Fn−kq
}
.
Then, for all Y ∈ B(S), we have T ∗Y = T ∗T
[
S
T
]
= S.
Therefore, any Y ∈ B(S) also belongs to the coset of the
space spanned by the rows of T ∗ whose syndrome is equal to
S. Moreover, since T is invertible, |B(S)| = 2n−k implying
that set B(S) is exactly that coset. The conditions of [4] as
stated above directly translate into (3), the remaining condition
of Thm. 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of securing a multicast network
implementing network coding against a wiretapper capable of
observing a limited number of links of his choice, as defined
initially by Cai and Yeung. We showed that the problem can
be formulated as a generalization of the wiretap channel of
type II (which was introduced and studied by Ozarow and
Wyner), and decomposed into two sub-problems: the first
one of designing a secure wiretap channel code and the
second of designing a network code satisfying some additional
constraints. We proved there is no penalty to pay by adopting
this separation, which we find in many ways illuminative.
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